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THE JUDICIARY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN JAPAN:
A SURVEY
HAROLD SEE*

An overly brief and misleadingly simple history of the evolution
of Japanese legal institutions would begin with the proposition
that a century and a quarter ago Japan was a feudal society. By
"opening" to the West, Japan was forced to "modernize" (Westernize) its laws. As a code system is easier than a common law system to impose wholesale on a society, the continental European
civil law countries served as a model for Japan, which patterned its
codes primarily on the civil code of Germany and the criminal code
of France. After defeat in the Second World War and subsequent
occupation by United States forces, both an independent judiciary
and an adversary system were superimposed on Japan's code system. This article surveys the changes in the Japanese judiciary in
their social context.
Although Japan adopted the codes of Germany and France, the
pre-code society did not disappear. This is evidenced by the disparity in relative numbers of judges and lawyers in Japan and
those in the code countries of West Germany and France. In West
Germany there are 3,502 people per judge and in France there are
15,156, as compared with Japan's 39,028 people per judge. In West
Germany there are 3,012 people per lawyer and in France there are
5,769, as compared with Japan's 14,354 people per lawyer.' These
figures may be explained in other ways, but since Japan is a commercially and industrially developed nation, it is doubtful that
they stem from a lack of conflict in need of resolution. Rather, one
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama; B.A., 1966, Emporia State University; M.S.,
1969, Iowa State University; J.D., 1973, University of Iowa. The author gratefully acknowledges the hard work and valuable assistance of his research assistant Ms. S. Kelly Watson,
J.D. 1981.
1. General Secretariat of the Supreme Court of Japan (unpublished report), reprintedin
Hattori, The Legal Profession in Japan:Its HistoricalDevelopment and Present State, in
LAw IN JAPAN 111, 152 (A. von Mehren ed. 1963). These figures are for the years 1958 (West
Germany and France) and 1960 (Japan). By 1979, the population-to-attorney ratio in Japan
had dropped to 10,067 people per lawyer. See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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would suspect that alternative means of dispute resolution are utilized in Japan beyond the judicial process.
To illustrate, the following is a table which depicts the litigation
which resulted from traffic accidents involving four taxi
companies:'

Company

Personal
Injury Claims

A
B

221
10

Property
Damage Claims
2,041
195
54
approx. 42

Total

2,262
205
58
approx. 42

Litigation
1
1
0
0

Similar statistics may be found for personal injury litigation
against the Japanese National Railways:'
Number of
victims of
physical
injury,
including
death
Number of
lawsuits

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

4645

5158

5169

5451

5818

6044

6317

20

20

22

20

19

18

24

During the period 1953 through 1959, less than one-half of one
percent of the personal injury incidents involving the National
Railways resulted in litigation, and less than one-tenth of one percent of the total personal injury and property damage accidents
involving the four taxi companies surveyed resulted in litigation.
The absence of litigation involves a complexity of factors - among
them being the role of the courts in Japanese society.
I.

TOKUGAWA JAPAN

To understand the role of the courts in contemporary Japan it is
helpful to understand the historical dvelopment of the Japanese
socio-legal structure. As early as the eighth century A.D., Japan
had adopted the Taih6 and Yor6 (criminal) Codes which were ad2. Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan,in LAW IN
von Mehren ed. 1963).
3. Id. at 63.

JAPAN

41, 42 (A.

1982]

DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN JAPAN

aptations of the Sui and T'ang Codes of China. The Taihd Ry6
and Yor6 Ry6, which spelled out the duties of each separate social
class, contained no "suggestion of the idea of rights."6 As the ritsuryo6 (the prohibitions and rules of administration of the Taih6 and
YorO) fell into disuse a military system ascended. It was similarly
without the concept of rights. The military caste lived according to
a customary code based on "feelings such as affection, fidelity, ab-7
negation, devotion to one person, the spirit of sacrifice to an idea,'1
and it required absolute faithfulness of the vassal to his suzerain.
From this social structure resulted a clear hierarchy during the
fourteenth century with the inferior classes resigning their existence to their superiors. By 1542 the Portuguese had penetrated
Japan, but the Christianity they imported so disrupted the existing
social order that the emperor "closed" Japan to the West, thus
producing over two-and-a-half centuries of isolation." In 1853, as
the culmination of Western pressures to trade mounted, Commander Perry "opened up" Japan. What Westerners encountered
was the isolationist Japan of the Tokugawa (feudal) era (16031868):
A whole series of rules, in nature much closer to rules of propriety
than morality, was developed in order to specify the conduct to
be observed on all occasions when one individual came into contact with others. These rules of behaviour, analogous to the Chinese rites, were known as girl. There was thus the girl of father
and son, the girl of husband and wife ... that of landowner and
farmer,. . . employer and employee, ..

and so on.9

F. Jotlon des Longrais observed that "[tihe Asia of Confucius preferred the ideal of a filial relationship based on attentive protecS.
5. R.

DANDO, JAPANESE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 12-13 (B. George trans. ed. 1965).
DAVID & J. BRiERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL Sys ms IN THE WORLD TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 492 (2d ed. 1978).
6. See generally Y. NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 22-26 (A. Angelo trans. ed.

4.

1976).

7. F. Joilon des Longrais, L'Est et L'Ouest. Institutions du Japon et de l'Occident compartes (six 6tudes de sociologie juridique) 144 (1958), quoted in R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY,
supra note 5, at 493.
8. See R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 5, at 494 n.48.
9. Id. at 495. Giri is a duty owed to others. This duty varies greatly depending on the
status of both the person to whom the duty is owed and the person owing the duty. Although the person owing the duty is expected to perform it, the recipient of the duty has no
right to demand that it be performed. If he applies pressure to obtain the duty owed him, he
has violated girl. Y. NODA, supra note 6, at 175.
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tion and respectful subordination to that of equality."' 1 Behavior
was governed by the giri and the giri was enforced by the attachment of social reprobation to any violation." In a basically feudal
social order with strong family and group ties such enforcement
was effective.' 2
Japan became "characterized by status relations among its members, who perceived each other in terms of a network of group and
family ties,"' largely of a suzerain-vassal type; but the rules of behavior, the giri, did not form a complete and integrated social network. Rather, they operated within such groups as family or community. Among unrelated groups the general Confucian doctrine of
harmony in nature applied; however, if agreement could not otherwise be reached, resort was to force.' 4 Where there was such resort
to force, or the prospect of it, the less powerful party might attempt to bring the prestige of the emperor to bear on his side by
taking the conflict to the emperor's courts.' 5 By and large, formal
law was considered "perhaps important as a symbol, but not some10. F. Joilon des Longrais, at 256, quoted in R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 5, at
495-96.
11. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 5, at 496.
"The rules of gir are not imposed by means of a system of public constraint but are
sanctioned simply by a feeling of honor. Those who fail in their giri are seriously dishonored. . . . They lose face." Y. NODA, supra note 6, at 178.
12. The unique nature of Japanese society may be due in great part to the fact that
Japan is an island nation, its physical separation from the continent preserving the congenital characteristics of its inhabitants. Y. NODA, supra note 6, at 172. The separation and
resulting racial homogeneity may have created a "greenhouse condition" that has nurtured
the homogeneity of thinking that characterizes the Japanese. See id.; Noda, Nihon-Jin No
Seikaku To Sono Ho-Kannen (The Character of the Japanese People and their Conception
of Law), 140 Misuzu 2 (1971), reprinted in THE JAPANEsE LEGAL SysmM 295, 296 (H.
Tanaka ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Noda in Tanaka]. "A Japanese believes that if another Japanese thinks differently, either he himself or the other must be wrong, it tacitly
being understood that if both of them are ordinary Japanese, they must think alike."
Unlike their nomadic counterparts on the continent, the Japanese tended to settle in one
place, remaining there for generations. This resulted in a close-knit familial society based
upon a central concept of harmony. Hajime, Basic Features of the Legal, Political, and
Economic Thought of Japan, in THE JAPANEsE MIND 143, 148 (C. Moore ed. 1967). In such a
society, the individual and his rights are less important than the group interest. See Kim &
Lawson, The Law of the Subtle Mind: The TraditionalJapanese Conception of Law, 28
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 491, 498 (1979). To insist on one's rights brings the censure of society.
Since "one's honor among one's fellows is of ultimate concern," to be censured by society or
cut off from the group is a powerful deterrent. F. GBNEv, JAPAN: THE FRAGILE SUPERPOWER
111 (rev. ed. 1979).
13. Danelski, The Supreme Court of Japan:An ExploratoryStudy, in ComPARATIVE JuDICIAL BEHAVIOR

121, 123 (G. Schubert & D. Danelski ed. 1969).

14. Kawashima, supra note 2, at 45.
15. Actually the power of government resided not in the Emperor, but in the Shogun
(the military). Henderson, Some Aspects of Tokugawa Law, 27 WASH. L. REv. 85, 92 (1952).
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thing for actual use, except as a last resort."" This function of the
courts was the traditional role of a social superior (the emperor) to

conciliate disputes between social inferiors.
The emperor's courts also served as an enforcement mechanism
for laws promulgated by the central government. Lest this function
be overemphasized, it should be noted that among the forms of law

and social control-statutes and decrees, "customs, Confucianistic
ideology,

court

precedents,

village

regulations

and

family

rules"-"the bulk of the rules actually observed by the people in
the country-side continued to be customary folk-ways which found
their origins in communal life, not the will of the shogun.

17

In

fact, even the role of the courts in the enforcement of the edicts of
the emperor differed from the role Western criminal courts perform. For example, in 1742 the O-Sadamegaki Hyakkaj6 (Code of

a Hundred Articles), a penal code, was promulgated.1 8 The courts
were an arm of the executive and Confucian doctrines viewed it as
the function of the government (a social superior) to teach the people how to behave properly. Thus, the Code operated more as a set
of instructions to officials than as a set of rules directed to the people generally. 19

In the feudal system there had been only an executive, but the
executive did perform judicial functions. The Shogun was the military leader of Japan. The daikan, the local representative of the
Shogun, was the court of first instance. If he failed to achieve a
settlement, the case could be referred to one of three departments

of the central government, but usually the case went to the finance
ministry. Finally, in exceptional cases, the Hyojosho (the "court"
of last resort) would decide the dispute.' 0
16.
17.

Danelski, supra note 13, at 123.
Henderson, Promulgation of Tokugawa Statutes in D. BuXBAUM, TRADITIONAL AND

MODERN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIA AND AFRICA 9, 10

18.

(1967).

Takayanagi, A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law, 18681961, in LAW IN JAPAN 5, 16 (A. von Mehren ed. 1963).
19. Id. Since the Code was not published to the people, it is often considered by Western
scholars to have been "secret law." On this point Dan Fenno Henderson observes that "it
was not the law-in-general, but just the O-Sadamegaki (and similar official guides) which
was secret. What conduct was prohibited was defined by law and promulgated by the best
available means." Henderson, supra note 17, at 10-11. "(T]he essence of Tokugawa adjudications was common sense and unfettered discretion in order that the judge (presumably a
wise and good man) could shape the penalty to all the peculiar facets of each individual
case." Id. at 15. The O-Sadamegaki served "as a uniform guide," but "not to confine them
[the judges] in their exercise of discretion." Id. This description of the function of Tokugawa judges views them as "teachers" of the people according to Confucian ideals.
20. Henderson, supra note 15, at 98-99. The Hyojosho was a court of assize composed of,
inter alia, the heads of certain ministries.

344

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:339

The law applied by Tokugawa "judges" was based largely on
precedent and constituted an evolving "common law" which grew
out of custom.2 ' Although such law may have served the Japanese
well, Westerners trading in Japan were not satisfied that the Japanese judicial system would respond adequately to their interests.
"Extraterritoriality" provisions were required in treaties with
Western powers. Therefore, Western nations insured that if their
nationals were involved in one side of a legal dispute, the issue
would be tried by a judicial officer of the Western nation, and
would be tried in accordance with the law of the Western nation.
The existence of extraterritoriality was a continuing source of humiliation to the Japanese. 2 To end extraterritoriality and in order
to take a place of equality in commerce, Japan adopted Western
civil and criminal codes. '

II.

THE MEIJI RESTORATION AND CONSTITUTION

The Meiji Restoration dates from 1868. Between that date and
1923 one code followed another, with numerous drafts and revisions of some of the codes. 4 In 1889 Japan adopted the Meiji Constitution, patterned after the Prussian Constitution and based on
the concept of the sovereignty of the emperor, not of the people,
with "individual rights limited by law, the cabinet largely independent of the Diet, and various organs of privilege and power, such as
the Privy Council and the military independent of the Cabinet." 25
Consequently, the courts did not adjudicate disputes between individuals and the state, except to the very limited extent that the
Administrative Court was given jurisdiction over certain disputes."
The basic sociolegal structure was not changed.
While the codes of the Meiji period were based primarily on
21.
22.

See Takayanagi, supra note 18, at 23.
For a discussion of the subject see F. JONES, EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN AND THE

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS RESULTING IN ITS ABOLITION 1853-1899 (rep. ed. 1970).
23. See D. ALLAN, ASIAN CONTRACT LAw: A SURVEY OF CURRENT PROBLEMS 6 (1969).

24. See generally Takayanagi, supra note 18, at 5-34.
25. Henderson, supra note 15, at 91. Prince It5 Hirobumi, who guided the Meiji Constitution into operation, had studied in Europe and greatly admired Bismarck. Id.
26. Hattori, supra not" 1, at 129-30.
27. It is clearly overstating the case to suggest there was "no change." As Dando states,
the younger members of former samurai families, in the Meiji Restoration, "destroyed the
feudal system of government and established in its place a modern, centralized, authoritarian form of government." S. DANDO, supra note 4, at 16-17. But he also observes that "on
calm reflection, one cannot deny that a legal system based on governmental authority serves
to preserve elements of a feudal society." Id. at 17.
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French and German law with some elements of Anglo-American
and Tokugawa law incorporated,' the judicial framework was
modeled after the French system.0 These institutional changes did
not revolutionize conflict resolution in Japan. As Zensuke Ishimura
states, the continental system of the Mieji era "was not well suited
to Japanese social conditions." 30 The Japanese resorted to the
more convenient and less expensive informal dispute settlement
devices which had their roots in feudal Japan. 1
One of the avowed aims of the Meiji Constitution was the separation of powers, but the Supreme Court of Japan has stated that
the Imperial Japanese (Meiji) Constitution has not realized the
ideal of the doctrine of separation of powers.3 ' Although legislative
power was to be exercised with the consent of the Diet, and judicial power by the courts, in practice "it was readily admitted that
the Emperor or the cabinet could ordain the rule which would bind
the people," and where there was a grievance against the government, the aggrieved party had to rely upon the benevolence of the
executive branch of government.3 3 To executive supremacy and the
absence of checks and balances" may be added the following:
[A]s a result of the retention by the Minister of Justice of the
power of general administrative supervision over the judiciary,
personnel administration within the judiciary inevitably was influenced by the government. Particularly noteworthy is the fact
that the Minister of Justice, by offering greater opportunity of
promotion, could induce promising judges and procurators to
enter the Ministry to perform general administrative functions.
This practice not only resulted in competent jurists leaving the
judiciary but also led people to think of the relationship between
the Ministry of Justice and the courts in much the same light as
that between a central administrative organ and its regional offices. This tendency reinforced by the traditional concept of the
judiciary ... led to a general evaluation of the status of the judge
28. Takayanagi, supra note 18, at 27-34.
29. Id. at 24-27.
30. Ishimura, Empirical Jurisprudencein Japan,in ComPAEATnIvs JUDicIAL BzHAviOR 49

(G. Schubert & D. Danelski ed. 1969).
31. Id.
32. Maki, The JapaneseConstitutionalStyle in THE CONSTuTiON OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST
TwENTY YEARs, 1947-67, at 3, 6-7 (D. Henderson ed. 1968).
33. SUPwRME COURT OF JAPAN, OUTLINE OF JAPANSHS JUDICIAL SYSTEM 1-2 (1961). Though
there was provision for the Court of Administrative Jurisdiction, in practice it was not a
court but a supervisory administrative office.
34. Maki, supra note 32, at 6.
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as inferior to that of the administrative official assigned to a Ministry's head office (though not to a regional office) ....
The Minister of Justice, who had the power to assign judges to particular
courts, also sometimes urged them to5 accept new assignments for
the convenience of the government.3
Prince It5 Hirobumi, the principal drafter of the Meiji Constitution, stated in his commentaries: "[t]he judicature is combined in
the sovereign power of the Emperor as part of His executive power
. . . the judiciary is only a part of the executive, and the executive,
strictly speaking, is made up of two parts the judiciary and the
administrative, each performing distinct services."" It was clear
that the judiciary was an arm of the Emperor and that "there was
37
no room . . . for a truly independent judiciary.
Despite the seemingly overpowering pressures against the independence of the judicial arm of government, as early as 1891 the
judiciary established the principle of judicial independence. In the
Otsu case a policeman was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment for attempting to assassinate the crown prince of Russia.
Even though the criminal code did not provide for the death penalty in any case other than attempts on the lives of the royal family, the government, on the theory that the attempted assassination was analogous to an attempt on the life of a member of the
royal family, had put heavy pressure on the Great Court of Judicature to levy the death sentence. The Court did not yield, though,
and imposed a life sentence, thus inaugurating a tradition of
independence."
The decade of the 1920's was a golden era for Japanese democracy (the Taisho Democracy) as the capitalist middle class engaged
in political activities. However, following the Great Depression
which hit Japan in 1927, a new ultranationalist autocracy arose
which lasted through the Second World War.3 ' Even during these
years of autocracy the Great Court of Judicature did not completely capitulate to the desires of the executive."0 Prime Minister
35.

Hattori, supra note 1, at 122-23 (footnotes omitted).

36. I. HiROBUMI, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNsTrrUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN (1889)
quoted in J. MAI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS,
1948-60, at xvi-xvii (1964).
37. J. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS,
1948-60, at xvii (1964).
38. Takayanagi, supra note 18, at 9-10.
39. Id. at 12.
40. Two examples are given by Hattori, supra note 1, at 122 n.40.
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Tojo attacked the judiciary for its uncooperative attutude and
threatened remedial action. In response, the president of one court
of appeals sent the prime minister a strong letter of protest."'
While this dramatic example was not the norm, it does suggest
that Meiji Japan laid some foundation for an independent
judiciary.
III.

THE

1947

CONSTITUTION-JUDIcIAL REVIEW AND JAPAN'S
SUPREME COURT

The 1947 Constitution prepared under American occupation
force guidance provided for an independent judiciary with the
power of judicial review.2 The Supreme Court of Japan viewed its
role as significantly changed by the new constitution:
With the enforcement of the New Constitution, great changes
have been brought about in the judicial system of Japan. The
highlights of the transformation are: firstly, the court has been
vested with the power to determine the constitutionality of any
law, order or regulation on the one hand and the power to make
rules on the other; and secondly, the court has obtained a complete independence from the executive branch of the State. Under
the old Constitution, the court was bound by the laws enacted by
the Diet and had no authority to declare legislative enactments
invalid because of their unconstitutionality. Moreover, judges as
well as the prosecuting organ attached to the courts were placed
under the administrative supervision of the Minister of Justice,
who was in charge of not merely the budgetary matters for courts
but also the matters of appointment and promotion of judges.
Under the newly-established judicial system, the court is separated from the prosecuting organ completely, with public prosecutors belonging to the Public Procurator's Office under the general
direction and supervision of the Minister of Justice. The power to
exercise administrative supervision over the courts has now been
conferred upon the Supreme Court. 8
The Court has also stated:
41.
42.

Id.
Takayanagi, Some Reminiscences of Japan's Commission on the Constitution, in
THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-67, at 71, 94-95 app. (D. Henderson ed. 1968). The deliberations of the Commission are reported in JAPAN'S COMMISSION
ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE FINAL REPORT (J. Maki trans. ed. 1980).
43. SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, OUTLINE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN JAPAN 3 (1959) (citations

omitted).
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Under the new Constitution, the court has become the protector
of the rights of the people as well as the guardian of the Constitution. In view of such an important mission assigned to the court,
the independence of the judicial power-though it was also acknowledged under the old Constitution-has a greater meaning
than before, and the autonomous independence of the court
should be respected to a great extent.44
Article 81 of the Constitution grants to the Court the "power to
determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act."' 45 In light of the role played by American occupation
forces in drafting the Constitution, the meaning of Article 81
might seem clear. But to the Japanese, with a long history of executive supremacy and continental legal thinking, the meaning of Article 81 was not clear. Although several eminent Japanese scholars
argued for the American type of judicial review, others favored a
judicial review likened to Austria and West Germany-only upon
invitation of certain executive or legislative bodies. 4 a The Supreme
Court, sitting as a constitutional court, would review a statute "in
47
the abstract" and issue a declaratory judgment as to its validity.
The Supreme Court first rejected this continental view in 1948, indicating in dictum that the court's interpretation of Article 81 corresponded with the American view of judicial review.' 8 Again, in
1952, the Court rejected the notion of a constitutional court empowered to review statutes in the abstract:
[W]hat is conferred on our courts under the system now in force
is the right to exercise the judicial power, and for this power to be
invoked a concrete legal dispute is necessary .... In other words,
the Supreme Court has power to examine the constitutionality of
laws, orders, and the like, but this power may be exercised only
within the limits of the judicial power."
44.

SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, OUTrLNE OP JAPANESE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 3 (1961).

45. KENP6 (Constitution) ch. VI, art. 81 (Japan).
46. See, e.g., Kakudo, The Doctrine of Judicial Review in Japan,2 OSAKA U.L. REV. 59,
60, 69-72 (1953).
47. Henderson, Japanese Judicial Review of Legislation: The First Twenty Years in
THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS 1947-67, at 120-21 (D. Henderson ed.
1968).
48. Bolz, Judicial Review in Japan: The Strategy of Restraint, 4 HASTINGS INT'L &
Coup. L. REV. 87, 98 (1980).
49. Suzuki v. Japan, 6 Sai-han minshii 783 (Sup. Ct., G.B. 1952), reprinted in J. MAKI,
supra note 37, at 362, 363-64.
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It appears that the Japanese interpretation of the doctrine of
judicial review was influenced by American practice. Nathanson
comments that "[f]rom a reading of the Japanese Supreme Court
opinions . . . one would apparently gather little hint that the Justices were aware of the English and American gloss on many of the
phrases which they are being called upon to interpret." 50 He continues, however, "there is little doubt that such precedents are well
known to the Justices and carefully considered by them. Perhaps it
is concern lest the Court appear to follow slavishly foreign precedents, which leads the Justices to eschew any mention of them." 5 1
Even with its newly legitimized independence and the apparent
adoption of an American styled judicial review, the Japanese Supreme Court has remained frugal with its independence. In the sixteen years following the adoption of the 1947 Constitution, the
Court declared only two statutes unconstitutional,5 2 and one of
3
them was no longer in effect when it was held unconstitutional.5
Beginning in 1973, the Court in fairly rapid succession held three
more statutes unconstitutional."' While these cases appear to be an
indication that the Court is now willing to exercise its power of
judicial review, it should be noted that all three of the cases were
decided between 1973 and 1976."'
The reticence the Court has shown in using its power of judicial
review has been criticized by several commentators.5 6 One writer
has described the Court as "remarkably reluctant to exercise with
50. Nathanson, Constitutional Adjudication in Japan, 7 AM. J. CoMP. L. 195, 217
(1958).
51. Id.
52. Nakamura v. Japan, 16 Sai-han keishu 1593 (Sup. Ct., G.B. 1962); Sakagami v. Japan, 7 Sai-han keishii 1562 (Sup. Ct., G.B. 1953). These cases are discussed in Bolz, supra
note 48, at 100-02.
53. M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDIcIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 64 (1971); Bolz,
supra note 48, at 100.
54. Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Commission, 30 Sai-han minshd 223 (Sup.
Ct., G.B. 1976); K.K. Sumiyoshi v. Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture, 665 Saibansho Jih5 1
(Sup. Ct., G.B. 1975); Aizawa v. Japan, 27 Sai-han keishii 256 (Sup. Ct., G.B. 1973). These
cases are discussed in Bolz, supra note 48, at 134-37.
55. One commentator cautions that viewing the Court as reluctant to engage in judicial
review prior to 1973 can result in "the danger of assuming that the justices have now simply
resolved to carry out their sworn duties." Bolz, supra note 48, at 90.
56. See, e.g., Dionisopoulos, JudicialReview and Civil Rights in Japan: The First Decade with an Alien Doctrine, 12 W. POL. Q. 269 (1960); Okudaira, The Japanese Supreme
Court and JudicialReview, 3 LAW ASIA 67, 91 (1972); Slomanson, Judicial Review of War
Renunciation in the Naganuma Nike Case: Juggling the Constitutional Crisis in Japan, 9
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 24, 25 (1975).
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any vigor the power of judicial review. '5 7 Compared with the present United States Supreme Court, this may seem true. The disparity in the ages and, therefore, the development of the two
courts makes such a comparison inappropriate." Whereas the
United States Supreme Court used its power of judicial review to
invalidate congressional acts only twice in its first sixty-eight years
of existence, the Japanese Supreme Court has held five statutes
unconstitutional in only half that time.59
The Japanese Supreme Court has accepted restraints on the exercise of the principle of judicial review. As long as the legislative
and executive branches stay within their respective spheres, the
Court prefers to leave review to the electorate. 60 Its reasoning is
that it is more consistent with democracy for the electorate to review the action of elected officials than for the Court to do so. By a
similar rationale, when the Diet attempted to investigate the decision of a district court, the Supreme Court firmly rejected the
Diet's right to interfere in judicial activities.
Another criticism of the Supreme Court involves its reluctance
to forge social change or to protect individual rights. 61 Maki, in
reviewing the major Supreme Court decisions in the Court's first
twenty years, states that there is ample support for the view that
the Court has neither fought aggressively to protect individual
rights nor used judicial review effectively to check the power of the
other branches of government, but he considers such evidence misleading.6 2 He points out that the entire collection of freedoms-from speech, religion and assembly to academic freedom
and the right of labor to organize and bargain collectively-was
given to the Japanese people. The Courts did not have to create
the rights. Rather, the role which remained for the Court was to
give substance to these rights.
In post-war Japan there was considerable social and political dislocation and upheaval which led to abuses of the rights of others.
The Court found it necessary to define, consistent with the public
welfare, the limits of individual freedom. Maki concludes:
57. J. STOCKWIN, JAPAN: DIVIDED POLITICS IN A GROWTH ECONOMY 183 (1975), quoted in
Bolz, supra note 48, at 92.
58. Bolz, supra note 48, at 133.
59. Id. at 133-34.
60. See J. MAKI, supra note 37, at xl-xlvi.
61. Nathanson, Human Rights in Japan Through the Looking-Glass of Supreme Court
Opinions, 11 How. L.J. 316, 323 (1965). Contra E. REISCHAUER, THE JAPANESE 264 (1977)
(stating that the courts have been zealous in the protection of individual rights).
62. J. MAKI, supra note 37, at xl-xlvi.
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As a result of the research that has gone into this volume, I
have come to the conclusion-valid, I believe, even though it is
that of a nonspecialist in the field-that the two main contributions of the Supreme Court in the field of constitutional review
are that it has given meaning to the content of the Constitution
and that it has consistently striven to establish the rule of law
under democracy in Japan. s3

IV.

RESOLVING CONFLICT IN A JAPANESE SOCIETY

The significance of the judiciary in the overall scheme of conflict
resolution in Japan is problematic. To understand the role of the
judiciary one must recognize the social context in which it functions. It is the Japanese view that good people neither trouble nor
are troubled by the law. "To be brought before a court, even in a
civil or private matter, is a source of shame; and this fear of shame
• . . is the determining motive in Japanese conduct."" This attitude appears to flow primarily from social and philosophical
sources.
It bears reiteration that historically the Japanese have emphasized "duty" to the exclusion of any notion of "right."" The Confucian doctrine required loyalty on the part of the inferior and benevolence on the part of the superior. The militarist Japanese
society elevated the concept of the inferior's duty and loyalty to
the virtual exclusion of any other duty and denied the inferior any
right of recourse to resistance." An example of the severity of social duty follows:
The samurai are the masters of the four classes. Agriculturists,
artisans and merchants may not behave in a rude manner towards
samurai. The term for a rude man is "other than expected fellow," and a samurai is not to be interfered with in cutting down a
fellow who has behaved to him in a manner other than is
63.

Id. at xlv. It should be recalled that the term "rule of law" is more than a platitude

in a society which historically based decisions on the social status of the parties.
64. R. DAVID & J. BRiERLEY, supra note 5, at 499.
65. The Japanese word for law, ho, carries with it no notion of substantive rights as
embodied in Western law. It was not until the early Meiji period when the French Civil
Code was being translated that the word kenri was coined to correspond to substantive
rights. Y. NODA, supra note 6, at 159; Takayanagi, supra note 18, at 25. Prior to that time,
"the law for most Japanese meant little else than the means of constraint used by the authorities to achieve government purposes." Y. NODA, supra note 6, at 37.
66. Henderson, supra note 15, at 105. Henderson lists as a basic tenet of Tokugawa Japan "A Rule of Man Instead of a Rule of Law." Id. at 101.
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67

It bears notice that no mention is made of recourse or administrative process. The samurai were literally judge, jury and executioner. The emphasis on duty did not end with the duty of others
to the samurai. The duty of loyalty "came to govern the relation
between merchant and clerk, artisan and apprentice, and even between gambler and pupil-every known relationship in Japanese
society." 68 "Justice" became "purely a matter of grace bestowed by
the military." 9 "The fundamental principle upon which this class
structure rested was that men are naturally unequal, by birth, and
from that principle it followed that in all phases of life they should
be treated unequally."' "° Even though social class, as defined by
law, was abolished during World War II, status continues as an
71
important factor in Japanese society.
In conflicts between social unequals, this means the social inferior defers to the social superior:
From the construction contract arises a relationship in which the
contractor defers to the owner as his patron; from the contract of
lease a relationship in which the lessee defers to the lessor; from
the contract of employment a relationship in which the servant or
employee defers to the master or employer; from the contract of
apprenticeship a relationship in which the apprentice defers to
the master; and from the contract of sale a relationship in which
the seller defers to the buyer (the former being expected in each
case to yield to the direction or desire of the latter). 2
The prime virtue is obedience and resistance is considered foolish.7 Though obedience, duty and loyalty are stressed, and although no recourse is given the social inferior, the Confucian doctrine is one of harmony and the relationship is to be patriarchal,
not despotic. 74 "[In other words, he is supposed not only to domi67. Id. at 95, citing 3 J. MURDOCH, HISTORY OF JAPAN 802 (1964).
68. Henderson, supra note 15, at 105.
69. Id. at 96. It is even reported that the merchant classes, the lowest classes, had to
submit to humiliation before they could use the courts. Id.
70. Id. at 92. This is a second of Henderson's tenets, that "Men are Unequal."
71. Haring, Japanese Characterin the Twentieth Century, 370 ANNALS 133, 136 (1967)
("IT]he average Japanese needs to know the status of everyone with whom he deals before
he can act with confidence.").
72. Kawashima, supra note 2, at 43.
73. Haring, supra note 71, at 135.
74. Kawashima, supra note 2, at 43.
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nate but also to patronize and therefore partially to consent to the
requests of his servant or employee.""' Between unequals there is

little chance that conflict will go beyond the relationship to a third
party.
Although relationships within social groups were defined by the
giri, relationships among social groups remained undefined. Therefore, force often came into play when a conflict arose between
members of different social groups, e.g., between members of different villages.7 6 The philosophy of harmony so pervaded Japanese
culture,7
however, that even here there was often amicable
settlement.
For example, Anglo-American contract law excuses performance
under such doctrines as frustration and impossibility only in extreme situations; otherwise the party must live with his contract-a contract which was made under conditions that invariably
no longer entirely exist.7 8 No such condition of immutability existed in Japan. Far from viewing a contract as something to be adhered to, the Japanese often regard a contract "as a sort of tentative agreement [which may be reformed as the circumstances
change]. 79e Rather than provide for every contingency in "black-

and-white terms," some areas are left "intentionally gray, so that
there will be room for modification and adaptation later on."80
The emphasis, drawn from the dynamic concept of harmony in
nature, is one of evolving human relationships. If a contract be75. Id.
76. "A special profession, the jidan-ya or makers of compromises, has arisen, particularly in the large cities. Hired by people having difficulty collecting debts, these bill collectors compel payment by intimidation, frequently by violence. This is of course a criminal
offense." Id. at 47.
77. "Shotoku Taishi, who drafted the [Meiji] 'Constitution of Japan,' wrote in article 17
that harmony is to be honored." Dai 51 Kai Teikoku Gikai Shfigi In Iinkai Sokkiroku (Stenographic Record of House of Representatives' Committees in the 51st Session of the Imperial Diet), category 5, no. 18, 3d Session, at 2 (1926), quoted in Kawashima, supra note 2, at
53.
78. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-613, 2-615; Restatement of Contracts §§ 455-61 (1932); Harris,
Contract and the Doctrine of Frustration,104 SOLIC. J. 966 (1960). See also Mahaska Co.
St. Bank v. Brown, 141 N.W. 459 (Iowa 1913).
79. Noda in Tanaka, supra note 12, at 308.
80. Ueno, Social, Economic and Political Trends in Japan in AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA

24, 27 (J. Haley

ed. 1978). Business contracts usually contain a good faith clause or an amicability clause.
From these clauses it is inferred that if a dispute arises the parties should renegotiate. Noda
in Tanaka, supra note 12, at 309-10. See generally Marks & Ono, Japanese Attitudes Towards Commercial Agreements With the People's Republic of China, 7 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
& COM. 53 (1979).
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came disadvantageous to one party, the other party would not hold
him to its terms."1 It is contemplated that a dispute will not arise,
and if one does, it will be amicably settled and harmonious relations will be preserved.8 2 Among equals in the same village the relationship is to be intimate, and social roles are flexible "so that
they can be modified whenever circumstances dictate."'8 Manifestations of the importance of harmony include the behavior of the
creditor who requests his debtor to perform his obligation," or the
victim of an accident who gratefully accepts an apology and a nominal sum as complete satisfaction for his injury. 8
Traditional culture required that if one party apologized the
other must forgive.80 Moreover, to be brought before a court was a
source of shame; therefore, to bring someone before a court was to
81. The samurai seem to be an exception to this rule as they are reported to have abided
by their contracts. Noda in Tanaka, supra note 12, at 308. According to Noda, however, this
was not due to any regard for the contract itself, such as is found in Western countries, but
"because they did not want to compromise their honor or their face as a samurai ....
[T]hey were motivated . . . by the need to satisfy their sense of self-respect." Id. at 309.
82. Kawashima, supra note 2, at 44, 47. The conditions which give rise to immutability
of contracts in Western law and mutability of contracts in Japanese law may be just the
opposite of those suggested in the text. In a world with little change, the cost of allowing for
it is very small. On the other hand, in a world wrought with change, a contract which can
hold certain factors constant can be of very great value.
83. Kawashima, supra note 2, at 44.
84. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 5, at 500. One commentator states, however, that
cases between moneylenders and their debtors are among the cases most often brought to
court. His explanation for this is that "[tihe usurer has no delicate feelings toward his
debtor." Y. NODA, supra note 6, at 182 & n.76.
85. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 5, at 500. Noda describes the typical settlement
of a damage case:
The most frequent means of resolving a damage case is for the victim of the injury
to renounce his right to indemnity. Usually what happens is that the author of the
damage comes to offer his apologies and at the same time offers a sum of money.
The sum is frequently much less than the extent of the damage suffered by the
victim, but the victim is quickly moved by a more or less sympathetic attitude on
the part of the author of the injury. It is not the amount of the indemnity but the
sincere attitude worthy of giri-ninjo on the part of the offender which is the impoitant thing to the victim. Sometimes the victim is so moved by the sincerity of
the author of his loss that he does not accept the sum offered to him. Exceptionally, the victim may seek reparation from the author of his loss, but even in this
case he does not want to go to court. He resorts rather to the authority of some
person such as a notable in the community or a police officer who has influence
over the person who has injured him. More rarely the victim even proceeds to
court, but this is only done in order to achieve an amicable settlement of the
dispute through the good offices of the court. Such extra-judicial procedures are
considered more honorable and desirable than the judicial. They save face for
both parties.
Y. NODA, supra note 6, at 182.
86. Kawashima, supra note 2, at 45.
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create disharmony, and "is hardly distinguishable in Japan from
extortion.""7 For this reason, all but the most acrimonious of disputes are settled without resort to litigation.
V.

RECONCILEMENT/CONCILIATION

The process by which interpersonal settlements are made
Kawashima calls "reconcilement." 8 He describes it in the following terms: "the process by which parties in the dispute confer with
each other and reach a point at which they can come to terms and
restore or create harmonious relationships. ' 89 As conditions change
and the needs of the parties change, adjustments are made to accommodate the new situation. Where the parties are not equals,
the social superior, the oyabun (a word meaning status of a father), 90 confers with and considers the needs and desires of the social inferior, the kobun (a word meaning status of a son),91 and
then makes a decision as to what the new relationship should be."
Where social equals are involved, the same process is involved, except that neither party can impose his decision on the other. If no
settlement can be facilitated, "conciliation"-reconcilement involving a third person-is utilized. This third person is preferably
someone of higher status than the disputants, thereby giving his
"recommendations" considerable weight.98
In Tokugawa Japan, disputes were settled within the village."
The head of the extended family, the head of a related group of
families, or the village headman acted as the conciliator. Carrying
disputes to the Shogun's courts was strongly discouraged.95 The
basis on which conciliation still operates is that the conciliator's
objective is to foster harmonious relationships between the parties." This means neither of them should be shamed, which is
what would happen if the conciliator were to say that one party
87. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 5, at 499-500. See also Y. NODA, supra note 6, at
181.
88. Kawashima, supra note 2, at 50.
89. Id.
90. Haring, supra note 71, at 136.
91. Id.
92. Kawashima, supra note 2, at 50.
93. Id.
94. Henderson, supra note 15, at 98.
95. Id. at 98-99.
96. Kawashima, supra note 2, at 51. Conciliation seeks to "strike a balance between the
two sides of a dispute, rather than necessarily determine the right and wrong of a situation."
Ueno, supra note 80, at 27.
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was right and the other wrong. On the other hand, since the dispute should
never have arisen, the result should punish both
7
9

parties.

VI.

KANKAI/CH6TEI

The period immediately following the Meiji Restoration was a
period of considerable social instability. The Shogun was overthrown, the emperor was reinstated to his powers and a concerted
program of "modernization" was begun. As a result of social instability the informal means of dispute resolution more frequently
broke down and litigation increased. In response to this set of
events the government instituted a formal process of conciliation
called kankai.9 Although the term literally means an "invitation
to reconcilement," kankai became a compulsory pre-litigation procedure. Moreover, it often failed to resemble reconcilement in that
settlement frequently was imposed on the parties by the court.
Instituted in 1876, kankai disappeared in 1890 with the adoption
of the Code of Civil Procedure, but in 1922, again due to social
unrest (this time resulting from urbanization and industrialization), ch6tei, another formal means of conciliation, was established. 9 Since traditional men of status were often unavailable or
ineffective as conciliators, the government substituted "mediators"
whose prestige was derived from their relationship to the government. Such a procedure was not alien to the Japanese since the
Japanese people historically had used the police with their position
of prestige and authority in the central government to act as conciliators.100 As provided by statute and Supreme Court Rules in
1951, ch6tei operates in civil cases and involves a conciliation committee comprised of a judge and at least two lay members.101 A
decision is not imposed, but, of course, the parties are operating
"under the psychological pressure derived from the 'halo' of a state
court.'

02

Although conciliation has been very popular in Japan,

the Western practice of arbitration has not,103 since arbitration im97. Kawashima, supra note 2, at 51.
98. Except as otherwise noted, the following information on kankai and ch~tei comes
substantially from Kawashima, supra note 2, at 52-56.
99. Kawashima, supra note 2, at 53-54.
100. Id. at 55-56. See von Mehren, Some Reflections on Japanese Law, 71 HARv. L. Rv.
1486, 1494 (1958).

101. H. TANAKA, JITTEi
(3d ed. 1974) reprinted in
102.
103.

H6GAKU NYUMON (Introduction to the Study
THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 492 (H. Tanaka

of Positive Law)
ed. 1976).

Kawashima, supra note 2, at 54.
Id. at 56. In recent years, however, there has been an increase in the inclusion of
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poses a decision on the parties rather than allowing the parties to
mold the outcome under the influence of a social superior.
The significance of ch6tei as a judicial function is demonstrated
by the figures for the years 1957_59.104 In the District and Summary Courts, on average approximately 15,000 judicial cases per
year were brought involving leased land and leased houses. At the
same time there were approximately 24,000 mediation cases
brought on the same subjects. Moreover, it is reported that a settlement is reached in nearly sixty percent of all civil conciliation
10 5
cases.
Undoubtedly, chdtei owes much of its popularity and success to
the social milieu in which it is operating, since the Japanese historically have placed considerable importance on harmony and have a
history of experience with conciliation. Kawashima reports the following statement on the subject by a member of the Diet:
Shotoku Taishi, who drafted the 'Constitution of Japan,' wrote
in article 17 that harmony is to be honored. Japan, unlike other
countries where rights and duties prevail, must strive to solve interpersonal cases by harmony and compromise. Since Japan does
not settle everything by law as in the West but rather must determine matters, for the most part, in accordance with morality and
human sentiment (ninj6), the doctrine of mediation is a doctrine
indigenous to Japan. . . . The great three hundred year peace of
the Tokugawa was preserved because disputes between citizens
were resolved harmoniously through their own autonomous administration, avoiding, so far as possible, resort to court
procedure.' o0
VII.

LITIGATION IN JAPANESE COURTS

The role of the courts as conciliator does not end with formal
mediation under ch~tei. Japanese judges, as creatures of their society, are interested in harmony and compromise. Looking at the
years 1952 to 1959 Kawashima discovered that over fifty percent of
the judicial cases brought in District Court, and nearly sixty percent of the cases brought in Summary Court, were either withdrawn (settled by the parties in the overwhelming number of those
arbitration clauses in labor contracts.
104. The figures are derived from
105. Gokijo, The Judicial System
106. Kawashima, supra note 2, at

Id. at 56-57.
Kawashima, supra note 2, at 62, Table 2.
of New Japan, 308 ANNALS 28, 37 (1956).
53 (quoting Stenographic Record of House of Repre-

sentatives' Committees, supra note 77).
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cases) or settled by judicial compromise. 0 7 "The courts in Japan
are far from being inactive, but the most important part of their
activity consists of conciliation rather than adjudication. "108
Prior to the Second World War Japanese civil procedure generally followed continental patterns 0 9 with the judge, a professional
civil servant, taking an active role in managing the litigation and
examining the witnesses. Trial was normally without a jury 10 and
occurred in a series of sessions. Judges were expected to perform a
clarification function."' When motions were unclear the judge was
expected to clarify them. When there was insufficient proof of facts
the judge was expected to supplement the evidence. All this was
aimed at assuring that the party who should win, did win, regardless of counsel. If this clarification function was not performed assiduously, the Great Court of Judicature reversed.""
The American occupation forces introduced a number of
changes. Criminal procedure was changed from an inquisitorial toward an accusatory system with the Anglo-American emphasis on
the rights of the accused. 11 8 Lawyers were generally given a larger
role in litigation and trials were consolidated in the Anglo-American fashion."" Judges were no longer required to clarify and the
burden was placed on the parties to submit proof and to examine
witnesses." 5 At first the bench appears to have adopted the new
procedure without reservation, but the legal profession as we know
it in the West is relatively new in Japan and had not enjoyed a
prestige status. Attorneys were viewed as "intruders, meddling uninvited in disputes which otherwise could have been resolved in
the traditional spirit of 'harmony.' """ As a result, there was no
107.

These figures are derived from Kawashima, supra note 2, at 55, 69, Table 12.

108.

R.

DAVID

& J. BRIFRLEY, supra note 5, at 500.

109. See von Mehren, supra note 100, at 1488-89.
110. Jury trial was established in 1923, but was not favored and not utilized. It was
abolished in 1943 and not reinstituted. Takayanagi, supra note 18, at 22. See also Y. NODA,
supra note 6, at 137-38.
111. Tanabe, The Processes of Litigation: An Experiment with the Adversary System

in

LAW IN JAPAN

73, 85-90 (A. von Mehren ed. 1963).

112. Id. at 89-90.
113. Takayanagi, supra note 18, at 23.
114. Tanabe, supra note 111, at 101.
115. Id. at 90.
116. Tanaka, supra note 101, at 265. See Tanabe, supra note 111, at 78. In criminal
cases, the attorney was not viewed as protecting the defendant's rights, "but as an apologist
begging for mercy, or even worse, as a schemer bent on thwarting the law." Tanaka, supra
note 101, at 265. In contrast to their view of defense attorneys, it is interesting to note that
the Japanese consider a judge who imposes lenient punishment on wrongdoers to be virtuous or humane. See Noda in Tanaka, supra note 12, at 303. The common person in Japan is
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trained, capable and respected group to carry the burden of managing litigation. This resulted in such practices as inept examination of witnesses, introduction of irrelevant evidence, and argumentative cross-examination. 117 Objections were little used, and
when they were used they were taken personally. In response to
this state of affairs and to the desires of citizens to see judges actively protecting their interests, judges began once again to play an
active role in managing the trial."1 " This new role was one of cutting off irrelevant, extraneous and improper evidence, inquiring
into areas neglected by counsel, requiring proper foundations to be
laid, influencing the order of presentation of a case, and putting
pressure on lawyers to come to trial prepared." 9 That is, Japanese
judges became active, but Japanese lawyers were given a considerably broader scope of activity than in the past.
In the decade following the Second World War, Japanese lawyers were slow to take upon themselves the task of molding litigation. This may be attributed to a composite of factors involving the
bar, the public and the bench. Rabinowitz identified the following
factors as impediments to the development of the Japanese bar: a
general lack of understanding by the lawyers as to what their role
should be; a reluctance on the part of the government to create an
area of monopoly for the bar; a failure of the bar associations to
develop into strong organizations; and a failure of legal education
to be practice-oriented. 120 Coupled with these bar-related factors
was the litigants' reluctance to use lawyers. In 1960 over forty percent of the parties in the District Courts and over sixty percent of
those in the Summary Courts appeared pro se. 2 1 This should not
be surprising since prior to 1890 representation by counsel was
strictly forbidden and public confidence in attorneys remained
low. 12 ' Finally, the managerial function performed by the judges"13
distrustful of lawyers, fearing that the lawyer may take advantage of his legal ignorance in
order to make money. See Hajime, Basic Features of the Legal, Political,and Economic
Thought of Japan,in THE JAPANESE MIND 143, 147 (C. Moore ed. 1967). It is not surprising
that one writer has observed that Japanese attorneys have little pride in the legal profession. Y. NODA, supra note 6, at 148. But cf. infra note 156 and accompanying text (social
standing of attorneys has improved in recent years).
117. Tanabe, supra note 111, at 101-03.
118. Id. at 103-05.
119. Id.
120. Rabinowitz, The HistoricalDevelopment of the JapaneseBar, 70 HARV. L. REv. 61,
78-81 (1956). For a listing of some of the non-lawyer specialists performing tasks which
might otherwise be handled by lawyers, see Hattori, supra note 1, at 145.
121. Calculations based on figures appearing in Hattori, supra note 1, at 146 n.145.
122. Id. at 145. See supra note 116.

360

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:339

impeded the development of the bar. In light of Japan's history of
hierarchical and paternalistic social relationships, and particularly
considering the large numbers of litigants appearing without counsel, judicial management of litigation probably is not surprising.
VIII.

JUDICIAL SHORTCOMINGS

Unfortunately, the management of the judicial process in Japan
has been critized for a lack of efficiency. In 1959 Chief Justice
Tanaka issued the following complaint and exhortation:
The slow progress of proceedings in the courts has from antiquity been a world-wide evil. It has become a chronic disease in
Japan. Anyone of common sense in Japan knows that a civil case
of little importance-for example a dispute of daily occurrence
over a rented house or land-will require at least three or four
years[""] before a final judgment by the court of last instance will
be given, if it should go to the court of last resort. Nor will a
criminal case be determined much more quickly, if appeal be
taken to higher courts.
This delay in justice generally is bitterly criticized by the press.
If such a condition continues, the realization of justice and the
protection of fundamental human rights, which are the courts'
aims, will be next to impossible, and confidence of the people in
the courts cannot be expected.
In order to bring about an improvement in the situation it is
imperative that judges entirely rid themselves of their inefficient
and easy-going ways, characteristic of bygone times for despatching [sic] judicial business. The administration of justice calls in
general, not only for sound interpretation of the law (or scholarship) and pursuit of truth (or historical sense), but also administrative efficiency. In Japan the judges have paid conscientious attention to the first and second qualities, but often not to the
third. The judicial conscience must be aroused and directed to
cultivating all three qualities equally; Japanese judges ought always to remember the maxim, "[j]ustice delayed is justice denied," in discharging their duties.
Prompt justice, however, will never be realized through the
mental preparation and efforts of judges alone. Lawyers must
share with the courts the responsibility for dilatory justice in Japan. When a lawyer is found not fully prepared for a scheduled
123. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
124. The length of the average trial was approximately one year. Tanabe, supra note
111, at 109 n.149.
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hearing and asks for postponement of a hearing more than once,
or proposes to introduce useless evidence, the judge in charge
often assents, simply out of the desire to have the proceedings
progress smoothly.'"
Although Tanaka attributes the drawn-out trial to the "inefficient and easy-going ways, characteristic of bygone times," it
should be remembered that Japanese judges are influenced by
their cultural values. The drawn-out, piecemeal trial allows the
parties' emotions to cool and gives an opportunity for private settlement of the dispute. 26 Such a result comports with harmony
better than would a judicial decree. Japanese judges have been
subjected to the countervailing pressures to consolidate trials, to
meet the special needs of an inexperienced bar and to provide sufficient opportunity for settlement.
The result of this process, as noted by Judge Tanabe, has been
called the "planned trial.' 2 7 Trial occurs in one session only in the
simplest of cases. Ordinarily there is an initial session during which
the judge is familiarized with the case. This session is thorough
and includes the examination of relevant documents. After the
necessary planning, two or three (or more in the most complicated
litigation) proof-taking sessions are scheduled for the examination
of witnesses. Following these, there is a final session during which
counsel and the judge tie the evidence together through final argument. As in the civil law countries, these sessions are usually
28
scheduled one month apart.
Tanaka's complaint is echoed today by commentators who cite
the drawn-out, one-day-a-month trial as a factor in delaying litigation,' 9 but a more frequently cited factor is the shortage of judges
and lawyers. 3 0° There has been little increase in the number of
judges since the Meiji period, while the population has nearly tripled."' The caseload on each judge is enormous, resulting in lengthy
delays in trial.'12 According to one Japanese authority, "[t]he need
125. Tanaka, Democracy and Judicial Administration in Japan,2 J. INT'L COMM. JUR.
7, 16-17 (No. 2, 1959).
126. Tanabe, supra note 111, at 99.
127. Id. at 108-09.
128. Haley, supra note 100, at 381.
129. Bolz, supra note 48, at 123; Haley, supra note 100, at 381.
130. See, e.g., Y. NODA, supra note 6, at 152; Bolz, supra note 48, at 121-23; Haley,
supra note 100, at 381-83; McMahon, Legal Education in Japan, 60 A.B.A.J. 1376 (1974).
131. Y. NODA, supra note 6, at 152.
132. See Haley, supra note 100, at 381. In 1974, United States District Court judges had
an average caseload of 325 cases, which was thought to be excessively high. In the same
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to increase the number of judges is urgent."'"3 The shortage of lawyers also is critical. As of 1979, there were only 11,536 licensed attorneys to serve a population of 116,000,000. 134 This contrasts with
more than 425,000 attorneys serving a population of 226,500,000 in
the United States in 1980.111 While this shortage clearly disturbs
many writers-one having reported that in "nearly 50 per cent of
the cases at the trial level, one or both of the litigants are unable
to obtain the services of a lawyer,"' 3 6-the Japanese public seems
unconcerned.' 37
IX.

THE LEGAL TRAINING AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE

The shortage of judges and lawyers has been attributed to the
small number admitted each year to the Legal Training and Research Institute of Japan."8' The Institute was established in
1957.1'9 The leaders of the Japanese bench and bar conceived the
Institute as a "radical new approach" in the training of future
judges, lawyers, and prosecutors. 10 Apprenctices admitted to the
Institute"' undergo a two-year professional training program
which consists of four months of study emphasizing the development of "an analytical legal mind and the skills needed to draft
legal documents;' 1 42 followed by sixteen months of field training
under the supervision of practicing judges, lawyers and prosecutors; the training ends with another four months of intensive study
at the Institute to receive a "final educational polishing." 143' This
year, the Japanese caseload was 1,708 cases per judge. Id.
133. Y. NODA, supra note 6, at 152.
134. Marks & Ono, supra note 80, at 58 n.18.
135. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, [1982-83] OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 98; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, [1981] STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 5.

136. McMahon, supra note 130, at 1379.
137. Tanaka, supra note 101, at 267. This absence of concern may be due to the poor
opinion once held of attorneys. See supra note 116. But see infra note 156 and accompanying text. It may also stem from the fact that many litigants still appear pro se. See Tanaka,
supra note 101, at 259-60.
138. McMahon, supra note 130, at 1379.
139. Thornton, Training Lawyers and Judges in New Japan, 58 JUDICATURE 128, 129
(1974).
140. Id.
141. See infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
142. Shikita, Law Under the Rising Sun, 20 JUDGES' J. 42, 44 (No. 1, 1981).
143. Id. at 45. Three articles on the Legal Training and Research Institute and its twoyear program are the following: McMahon, supra note 130; Shikita, supra note 143; Thornton, supra note 140.
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program has not only resulted in better trained lawyers,"" it has
vastly improved the relationships among the judiciary, the practicing bar, and the government prosecutorial agencies.14 5
To become a judge, lawyer, or prosecutor one must complete the
two-year program at the Institute.'" Admission to the Institute is
conditioned on passing the National Law Examination.' 4 7 The
passing rate on the examination has steadily dropped over the
years as the number of applicants has increased.14 8 Of the nearly
30,000 applicants taking the examination in 1977, only 1.6%
passed. 4 9 This means only 500 apprentices were admitted that
year who would have graduated in 1979.150 Since the government
entirely funds the training program, and pays an allowance of approximately $10,000 per year to each apprentice,8 1 the official reason stated for the low number of admissions is that "it would cost
the government too much to fund additional students.' 11 2 One
writer suggests, however, that this low passing rate is a result of
the government's policy of discouraging litigation.1 3
Upon completion of the training program at the Institute, graduates choose to become judges, lawyers, or prosecutors.'" The social
standing and income of practicing lawyers have improved in the
last few years " and the number of graduates choosing to become
144. See McMahon, supra note 130, at 1378.
145. Shikita, supra note 143, at 46.
146. Id. at 42.
147. This examination, although given before professional legal training, roughly corresponds to the bar examination in the United States. Id. at 45. It consists of three parts: "a
multiple choice test on constitutional, civil, and criminal law; an essay exam on seven subjects-constitutional, civil, criminal, and commercial law, plus three subjects selected from
laws of civil or criminal procedure, from such specialized fields as labor law, public or international law, or criminology, and from such related sciences as economics or social policy,
political science, finance, or psychology; and an oral exam on the same seven topics." Id. at
42-43. A final exam is given at the end of the two-year program but "lilt is noncompetitive
and failure is unusual." Id. at 45.
148. Id. at 43.
149. Id.
150. Approximately the same number graduated that year from just one of the numerous law schools in the United States. See ASSOCIATION OF AaMIcAN LAW SCHOOLS & THE
LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, [1979-80] PRELAw HANDBOOK 156. (There were 1,621 J.D.
students enrolled in the Harvard University School of Law for the academic year 1978-79.
Assuming that a third of these were third-year students, over 500 students graduated in
1979.)
151. Shikita, supra note 143, at 45.
152. Bolz, supra note 48, at 121.
153. Haley, supra note 100, at 385-86.
154. McMahon, supra note 130, at 1376.
155. Tanaka, supra note 101, at 265; Bolz, supra note 48, at 137.
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lawyers has increased.1 56 Since a Japanese lawyer's role is limited
almost exclusively to representation in litigation, " this should facilitate litigation by making it easier for a party to obtain representation. With fewer graduates becoming judges, however, it is to be
expected that the already overburdened dockets will be further
strained.

X. A JAPANESE LEGAL ORDER
From the point of view of official rules, institutions and legal education, the Japanese legal system is more closely related to the
civil law than to the common law. Most of Japan's substantive law
codes are continental in origin. However, many individual rules,
such as the Juvenile Law of 1922, Japanese Trust Law, the Code of
Criminal Procedure, and the new Constitution are clearly of AngloAmerican origin. Since Japanese jurists are not trained in the common law, they tend to interpret even common law rules and principles using civil law techniques. 15 8 "In many ways, however, the
Japanese legal order is markedly different from Western legal orders, common and civil law alike."" Moreover, to argue the relative degree to which Japanese law is continental or Anglo-American is to miss the much larger point. The wholesale incorporation
of continental code law and practice, while giving a framework for
formal Japanese law, has left the lives and practices of most Japanese virtually untouched. 1 60 Von Mehren states that "[p]erhaps the
most striking aspect of Japan's transition . . . is that this was accomplished while preserving many of the traditional society's patterns and values." 161 Retention of the cultural pattern of conciliation distinguishes Japanese law from that of the Western models
on which it is based. " "Tokugawa law was predominantly customary law, and was particularly suited to Japan; and despite the fact
that it was 'abolished' upon the introduction of Western codes, the
living law which it reflected continues in modern Japan. '163
While the introduction of Western codes may have had little im156.
157.
consult
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Y. NODA, supra note 6, at 142.
Tanaka, supra note 101, at 257. It is very rare for an "ordinary private citizen" to
an attorney before drawing up a will or buying or selling real estate. Id. at 258.
Takayanagi, supra note 18, at 22, 33-34, 37.
von Mehren, supra note 100, at 1491.
Id. at 1491-93.
Id. at 1492.
Wren, The Legal System of Pre-Western Japan, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 217, 222 (1968).
Id. at 219.
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pact on Japanese society, the economic and cultural changes since
the Second World War have left their mark. Industrialization has
resulted in people moving to the cities to obtain an education or a
job.16 4 Once in the city, many stay, contributing to the breakdown
of the old familial, group-oriented society. 166 The nuclear family is
becoming more prevalent as many younger Japanese are unwilling
to live with their parents in the traditional fashion. 1 6" Modern education has encouraged these young Japanese to think independently. 167 The effect of this "[l]iberation of the individual" 1" and
the rapid change from an agrarian society to a highly industrialized
society is summed up by Mikaso Hane:
The problems confronting Japan today are not unique. The decline of traditional values and institutions, and the search for
meaning and purpose continue elsewhere in the industrialized,
Westernized societies that have also left their tribal and familial
stages far behind. Like other societies, Japan faces such problems
as the dislocations and disorientations caused by the exceedingly
rapid pace of change that has been brought about by science and
technology; air and water pollution; the desecration of nature; the
threat of nuclear destruction; the population explosion; the undermining of the sense of mystery and awe by rationalism and
science; the abandonment of the sense of unity with nature and
the universe that was at the root of Shinto; and the continued
inability of man to stop abusing his fellowmen.'"
Accompanying these economic and social changes of recent years
has been reported an increase in litigation. 17 0 Moreover, the type of
cases being litigated is changing. At one time, the majority of cases
brought into court were business related cases "concern[ing] rela164. C. SCHIROKAUER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHINESE AND JAPANESE CIVILIZATIONS 574
(1978).
165. Id. at 575.
166. See id. at 575, 577. While Western law has emphasized the role of the individual,
Japanese law and custom has emphasized the group. See R. DAVID & J. BRIERLY, supra note
5, at 498-99. So important was the group in Tokugawa Japan that it was not uncommon for
the headman of the village to be punished for the crimes of his villagers. Henderson, supra
note 15, at 104-05.
167. See Noda in Tanaka, supra note 12, at 296.

168. M.

HANE, JAPAN:

A

HISTORICAL SURVEY

602 (1972).

169. Id. at 603.
170. See Y. NODA, supra note 6, at 181 n.74. Statistics compiled by Haley show that the
number of cases filed between 1949 and 1958 in general indicated a steady increase. The
number of cases filed in the years 1959 to 1974, however, were rather erratic, sometimes
increasing from one year to the next, sometimes decreasing. Haley, supra note 100, at 369,
Table 3.
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tionships between large enterprises which [were] competing with
each other for purely economic interests, or between moneylenders
and their debtors.""1 Now it appears that personal injury and
other non-business related cases are becoming more common." 2
The liberation of the individual is also being reflected in Supreme Court opinions. All pre-Second World War Great Court of
Judicature opinions were per curiam, and, ostensibly, unanimous. 17 Article eleven of the Court Organization Law adopted in
1947 "states '[t]he opinion of every Supreme Court justice shall be
expressed in written decisions.' "174 A statistical analysis of the
Court's opinions from 1947 to 1962 demonstrates that there has
been a gradual but "progressive rise in individualism in the Japanese Supreme Court, 1 5 and in terms of absolute number,
nonunanimous decisions are approaching fifty percent.'7 6
Even with these changes, it is clear that traditional Japanese attitudes and values are prevalent. 17 7 In his article analyzing four
Japanese pollution suits, 17 Frank Upham demonstrates that the
disapproval of one's peers17' and shame on the part of the victim 8 0
171. Y. NODA, supra note 6, at 182.
172. See THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 405-43 (H. Tanaka ed. 1976) (selection of newspaper excerpts, many dealing with personal injury suits); Upham, Litigation and Moral Consciousness in Japan: An Interpretative Analysis of Four Japanese Pollution Suits, 10 L. &
Soc'y REV. 579 (1976).
173. Kawashima, Individualism in Decision-Makingin the Supreme Court of Japan, in
COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR

103 (G. Schubert & D. Danelski ed. 1969). This merely

followed the societal pattern of consensus which derives from the attitude that relationships
within the group should be intimate and that harmony should prevail. Decisions made
within the village are made by the yaryoka-sha ("power holders"). Haring, supra note 71, at
135. Discussion is open and often quite frank. Then, without a vote, the village head announces the "consensus" of the meeting.
174. Kawashima, supra note 174, at 103.
175. Id. at 117.
176. Danelski, supra note 13, at 137. This new rule has also resulted in increasing the
Court's work load, see McMahon, supra note 130, at 1379, and in confusion "in many cases
as to the precise rationale of the decision," Bolz, supra note 48, at 132.
177. It is often thought, even in Japan, that the traditional norms such as the groupcentered society have declined. A. BURKS, JAPAN: PROFILE OF A POSTINDUSTRIAL POWER 209
(1981). Although the Japanese may display a "superficial affection" for new ideas and values, see M. HANE, supra note 169, at 602, recent surveys show "a remarkable resurgence of
traditional values." A. BURKS, supra, at 209.
178. Upham, supra note 173, at 579.
179. Id. at 591-94.
180. "[Tlhe general Japanese attitude toward physical or mental deformities or abnormalities" is one of shame. Id. at 590. The families of a retarded or handicapped child often
keep the child hidden in order to avoid the shame that would be associated with such a
child. Id. In the pollution cases, the "weird diseases" caused by mercury and cadmium
poisoning were a source of shame to the victims and resulted in a reluctance to sue the
polluting companies and thereby make their shame public. Id. at 590-91.
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remain factors discouraging litigation. There still is little "rights
consciousness" among the Japanese,18 1 who have taken only their
first "toddling steps toward the recognition of others' rights.'" 2
The traditional emphasis on apology as a remedy has not disappeared. A reporter assessing the reactions of the Minamata plaintiffs' 88 on their first day of trial writes: "The significance the patients attached to this suit-it wasn't just money, just the
compensation. It was to make the presidents of the companies that
had inflicted this illness on them say just one word, 'I'm sorry.' "I"
This same principle is embodied in the practice of shazaik~koku. 85 In the area of unfair competition, when one party damages another's reputation or credit, the court may require that he
publish an apology. Since it is consistent with notions of harmony
and with private behavior, the apology resolves the dispute. 's e
To reemphasize traditional Japanese society's role in its present
judicial scheme, von Mehren points out three basic Western principles which are not widely accepted in Japan: (1) the result of one's
conduct should be highly predictable; (2) "full effect is to be given
to a party's legally justified claims"; and (3) disputes should be
resolved without regard to the socioeconomic status of the
87
disputants.
The first of these Western principles is irreconcilable with the
Japanese notion of harmony. If one presses his "rights" to the fullest measure, then he is disruptive, even "morally wrong, subversive, and rebellious."'8 s The second principle is contrary to the
idea of compromise. A clear-cut adjudication for one party and
against the other identifies the losing party as a guilty person, a
dishonest man, and is a. source of shame to him.I s This is contrary
to notions of harmony. Judges therefore hesitate to find clear-cut
responsibility and prefer to attribute partial fault to each party.'90
181. See Y. NODA, supra note 6, at 173.
182. Noda in Tanaka, supra note 12, at 305.
183. The Minamata plaintiffs were victims of mercury poisoning and sued the company
responsible for the contamination of their water supply and fisheries.
184. Upham, supra note 173, at 597. The presidents of the companies were not at the
trial. Even if the companies lost, the president would escape "[t]he guilty conscience, the
pain he should feel as a human being, the recrimination." Id. at 598.
185. See generally Eguchi, The Publication of Apology ("Shazai-Kokoku") as a Remedy for Unfair Competition in Japan, 18 OsAKA L. RzV. 19 (1971).
186. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
187. von Mehren, supra note 100, at 1496.
188. Kawashima, supra note 2, at 45.
189. R. DAVID & J. BRiERLzy, supra note 5, at 499.
190. Kawashima, supra note 2, at 48 n.20.
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Preferably, judges actively seek to bring about settlements or
compromises. 191
The third principle, that disputes should be resolved without
reference to the socioeconomic status of the individual, is contrary
to the idea that men are unequal and that society is properly hierarchical. Litigation is more likely to occur between, rather than
within, social groups. In such a situation there is commonly resort
to force, with the weaker party turning to litigation. This resort to
since Japanese judges attach imporlitigation is often ineffective,
es
tance to a fait accompli.
Although litigation is increasing in Japan, in comparison with
similarly developed industrialized nations, the number of cases litigated remains low."' Whether it is due to the Japanese belief that
judicial methods are not conducive to harmony, the feudal attitude
that one does not trouble one's lord with private matters, the fact
that the Japanese are not assertive of their rights, the fact that
litigation is too expensive in time and money,' the shortage of
judges and lawyers, or, what is more likely, a combination of these
reasons, it is apparent that most disputes do not reach the courts.
And those that do reach the courts are often settled in a traditional manner under the judge's guidance. While the importation
of Western codes and the American occupation has influenced Japanese law and the Japanese attitude toward law, it should also be
remembered that Japan remains culturally Japanese."95

191. Id. at 55.
192. Id. at 48-49.
193. See Haley, supra note 100, at 364 Tables 1 & 2.
194. Takayanagi, supra note 18, at 39. See Hajime, supra note 12, at 147.
195. See Y. NODA, supra note 6, at 183. "Japanese spirit will change in the course of
time, but it will always be Japanese."

